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FOREWORD
One of the realities of modern military operations has been
that they are often subjected to intense scrutiny by the
international news media. Under most circumstances, the
deployment of U.S. forces attracts large numbers of print and
broadcast journalists dedicated to providing their audiences with
near real-time information of varying accuracy and completeness.
This extraordinary availability of information may well affect
the agenda of the executive and legislative branches of
government and have important impacts on military decisionmakers
in operational theaters.
Over the course of the next six months, the Strategic
Studies Institute will examine the impact of the media's
technological advances on strategic and operational level
planning and policymaking, first in an overseas theater, and
subsequently on decisions made at the national level. The first
of these two studies recognizes the complexity of executing
military operations under the scrutiny of a very responsive, high
technology world news media. Given the volatile, unstable, and
ambiguous environment in which armed forces can find themselves,
the actions of field forces have a greater chance than ever
before of affecting subsequent strategic decisions made at higher
levels. The pressure on field commanders to "get it right the
first time" is demonstrably greater than ever.
The author intends that these thoughts provide commanders
with an understanding of the high technology and competitive news
media environment they can expect to experience and offers
specific suggestions for successfully communicating with
reporters. To that end, and as a departure from its normal focus
on strategic issues, the Strategic Studies Institute is pleased
to publish this monograph to assist operational commanders and
their staffs and to contribute to improving the efficiency of the
relationship between the military and the news media.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Some of the more enduring images of Operations Desert Shield
and Desert Storm involved soldiers in observation posts with
forests of television cameras and still photographers packed
tightly around their positions. In such situations, those troops
couldn't even have seen the enemy, let alone report about
him.There were also the news conferences with questions often
shouted so loudly and randomly that they couldn't be
distinguished, let alone answered. More recently, Marines landing
in the darkness on the beaches near Mogadishu, Somalia, found
themselves surrounded and illuminated by scores of journalists.
And through it all have been the descriptions of conflict and
bitterness, and journalists' charges of deliberate deception by
the military.
Much work has been done to trace the origins of the
persistent tension between the military and the news media. Often
the research strives to outline the history of the relationship
and seeks to identify similarities in institutional culture and
purpose on which to base agreements to guide future contacts. Yet
it seems inevitable that such schemes collapse in the first
stressful stages of a crisis or conflict as they are inevitably
artificial. This is because the military and the news media
pursue very different objectives and often hold very different
values.
This study seeks to move the discussion forward by
acknowledging the diversity and examining those news media issues
which will most affect commanders as they execute their assigned
missions. It makes no pretense at providing a template for
conducting successful media relations operations. However, it
does identify various planning factors which should be considered
as commanders prepare their public affairs' concepts of
operation.
At the very least, commanders' concerns focus on their
annoyance at the numbers of reporters, wariness over the news
media's advanced technology and frustration at the lack of
knowledge so many journalists display while covering the
military. These reactions often cause commanders to distance
themselves from reporters or attempt to control them while
gathering the news in the hope that such supervision will reduce
the risks of security violations and confusing news reports. The
American experiences in Grenada (1983) and Desert Shield/Storm
(1990-91) and the British actions in the Falkland Islands (1982)
are often cited as models for learning coping strategies for
dealing with the news media.
Yet those are not reliable precedents. In each case the
journalists had to be imported because there was no significant
news media presence indigenous to the areas of operation. It
would seem that the experiences in Panama (1989) and, especially,
Somalia (1992-93) are more useful models for understanding the

evolving environment of news media coverage of military
operations. History records that there were nine civilian war
correspondents on the island of Tarawa in the South Pacific in
1943 and fewer than 30 on the invasion beaches of Normandy in
1944, but those figures are now only of passing interest. The 600
reporters in the entire Pacific Theater in World War II were
nearly matched by the 500 journalists who quickly appeared on
tiny Grenada and in Panama City, and clearly surpassed by the
more than 1,500 who covered the Persian Gulf War and the disaster
relief operations in Florida (1992).
There is no longer a question of whether the news media will
cover military operations. Regardless of mission, they will
inevitably be interested in the drama, uncertainty and emotion.
As in Somalia, journalists will likely precede the force into the
area of operation; and they will transmit images of events as
they happen, perhaps from both sides of any conflict. Thus the
commander's operational task is to develop a well resourced and
responsive infrastructure to conduct news media relations.
Failure to do so will not affect the scale of news media
coverage; it will, however, limit the command's ability to
communicate effectively and risk distorting the public's
perception of the military's effectiveness. In the face of such
challenges, efforts at control are meaningless.
Whereas once the military trained to fight outnumbered to
win, today's news media environment has generated a new
imperative: For every operation, commanders must also communicate
outnumbered to succeed. While difficult to measure, that success
is defined in terms of credibility with the news media and with
the various American and international publics. Thus, mutual
understanding and accommodation are more useful than evasion or
angry confrontation.
Commanders can best prepare for their encounters with the
news media by understanding the roles and capabilities of the
journalists who cover military operations; accepting the
inevitably and desirability of their access to the force;
appreciating the importance of technology and its impact on
operations security; identifying and providing the resources
necessary for timely support for the media relations mission; and
recognizing the necessity for appropriate education and training.
If ignored, each of these represents a potential flashpoint for
future disagreements. If addressed comprehensively, they can form
the basis for cooperation in the midst of what will inevitably be
complex and confusing situations.

THE MILITARY-NEWS MEDIA RELATIONSHIP: THINKING FORWARD
The Operational Environment.
There is a popular view that the often tense relationship
between the military and the news media is a recent product of
hard feelings and misunderstandings generated during the Viet Nam
War. In contrast, this perspective claims, the contacts between
the two institutions during World War II were usually amicable
and cooperative. This view of history appears to be overly
simplistic and not entirely accurate. Shelley Smith Mydans, a
Life magazine war correspondent in the Pacific Theater 50 years
ago, suggests that a sense of common purpose at that time (the
defeat of America's enemies) should not be misinterpreted as
unquestioning news media support of the political decisions and
military actions taken in pursuit of that goal.1
It is interesting that a survey of the writings of various
war correspondents and discussions with others of that era reveal
that the issues of concern today were just as important to the
journalists covering the military in those earlier years. In
addressing this phenomenon, Hodding Carter has said in the case
of military-news media relations, "the wheel often gets
reinvented, but it travels over very different terrain.2 Then, as
now, the central news media concern involved the fear of
censorship. But issues such as access to the forces,
communications, operations security, transportation and logistics
support also were of interest. In recent years, deficiencies in
any of these have been interpreted by many in the news media as
attempts by the Department of Defense to impose censorship
indirectly. For instance, using news media pools to cover combat
units during the Persian Gulf War or relying on slow ground
transportation to deliver news media products were seen as
deliberate efforts to restrict journalists from covering stories
or to delay their reports once produced.
The important realization is that the issues really haven't
changed nor, by extension, have the commanders' responsibilities
to ensure that their organizations are in the best position to
conduct professional news media relations programs appropriately
tailored to their assigned missions. Quite simply, the commanders
most likely to succeed will be those who have accurately assessed
the level of news media interest in their operation and have
anticipated and provided the assets necessary to accomplish the
news media relations mission.
The instinctive military need for control is irrelevant in
the face of an institution which can field, depending on the size
of the operation, thousands of reporters who are equipped with
instantaneous communications capabilities and who often
understand alarmingly little about the stories they are covering.
Once again, the challenge and the failure to adapt aren't new. In
speaking about his experiences at Pearl Harbor on December 7,

1941, Frank Tremaine (United Press) reported that "the military
was no more prepared to handle news coverage than for handling
the Japanese."3 Yet it is always important to be selective in
reviewing earlier experiences.
Lessons derived from anecdotal discussions about the
circumstances surrounding Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada) and
Operations Desert Shield/Storm are limited by the fact that they
were unique situations not likely to be replicated. Like the
British efforts in the Falkland Islands, geographical and
political circumstances dictated that the news media had to be
imported and matched up with the forces. The challenges presented
by reporters during Operations Just Cause (Panama) and Restore
Hope (Somalia) are far more relevant for study because of the
presence of significant numbers of journalists in place before
operations began and their open access to most areas of
operation.
Similarly, news coverage of the fighting in the former
Yugoslavia has been conducted for several years by numerous
independent, well-equipped journalists who move about freely and
flood the international news media with their often compelling
reports.
Media relations in any operation cannot be left to chance or
to a particularly clever public affairs staff. While language
like "handling journalists" and "coping with reporter demands"
sounds defensive and may appear to revert to attempts at control
of the news media, it is useful for understanding the
requirements facing field commanders. A carefully-planned,
well-resourced and decisively-positioned infrastructure is
necessary for communicating through the news media to the
American and, increasingly, international publics. This means
that organizations need to be "proactively-reactive": reactive to
the extent they must be responsive to news media interest;
proactive in that knowledgeable assessments, comprehensive
planning and advanced preparation will inevitably determine how
effectively they will be able to respond.
Unity in the media relations effort is achieved through the
development of public affairs guidance which assists the entire
chain of command in communicating consistent and credible
information. Although the public affairs plans are approved by
the Office of the Secretary of Defense,4 commanders at each level
have a role in formulating the policy, news statements,
information packages, and media support arrangements which make
up the plan.This effort ensures that those most knowledgeable
about the operation play a major role in developing the messages
to be communicated. Effective command information programs are
also important to ensuring that everyone likely to encounter
journalists will understand the mission and their role in it,
aspects which are always of interest to reporters covering the
military.

To succeed, commanders must "think forward" historically,
operationally, and geographically. The perpetuation of
confrontation and debate over events past is not useful. Attempts
to look back and justify specific decisions or actions do help in
gaining understanding, but they also serve to reinforce the sense
of conflict between the institutions. Continuing to focus on
historical events can cause both the military and the news media
to appear to be preparing themselves to conduct media relations
as they did in the last conflict or deployment. As with any
operational task, the only relevant lessons of the past are those
which can be applied to improve readiness and performance in the
future.
Additionally, the success of the media relations program
rests on the ability of the commander and staff to assess the
intensity of news media interest in the mission at hand and to
anticipate the personnel, communications, transportation, and
deployment requirements necessary to communicate through the news
media during every stage of the operation. In the complexity of
today's international security environment, this will often
require rather creative applications of judgment. This is
especially true since the news media will inevitably appear
before commanders are fully prepared to accommodate them.
Therefore, regardless of mission, commanders should immediately
designate an official source of information (normally the public
affairs officer) and activate an information center. Taking the
early initiative in these efforts will usually serve to channel
reporters to those trained to communicate with them, thus
reducing their random movement throughout the area of operation
and their unplanned, sometimes disruptive visits to units. These
outcomes are also desirable for journalists in their efforts to
cover the story and will assist in establishing a constructive
dialogue.
Finally, the true challenge for the Department of Defense
and its military commanders does not reside in the formal
briefing room where well-trained spokespersons are prepared to
answer news media questions. It lies, instead, in the
forward-deployed units where young leaders, inexperienced with
the news media and facing a kaleidoscope of important tasks, are
confronted by reporters competing with their colleagues for a
unique angle on the operation. Guidance and training for the
tactical commander should become a regular part of operational
preparations. The education process should begin with a simple
orientation to the military—news media relationship in the
officer basic course and continue with increasing complexity
through the advanced courses and the Combined Arms and Services
Staff School to the senior military schools. A similar pattern
should become part of the education system for NCOs.
Since news media contacts with the tactical leadership are
inevitable, commanders and their public affairs staffs must
concentrate on thinking forward in their planning for the media
relations mission. From a commander's perspective, the thoughts

generated by the discussion of the issues identified in this
study should become planning factors for the development of a
responsive news media relations infrastructure.
The Military-News Media Environment.
It is ironic that much of the disagreement between the
military and the news media is based on an element of essential
agreement. Both institutions view the information available in
operational units to be very important and vitally interesting.
But their reactions to this common judgment vary significantly:
The military's response has often been to prevent the release of
such information because of various concerns ranging from
potential embarrassment to operations security, while the news
media's response is typically to seek immediate release because
of the "public's right to know."
Shortly before the invasion of Normandy, General Dwight D.
Eisenhower addressed this tension with reporters: "The first
essential in military operations is that no information of value
shall be given to the enemy. The first essential in newspaper
work and broadcasting is wide-open publicity. It is your job and
mine to try to reconcile those sometimes diverse
considerations."5 In these words lie the basis for cooperation
through the development of ground rules and procedures which seek
to define "information of value" and outline parameters for its
reporting.
History records that the effort was generally successful. At
the entrance to the American Cemetery at St Laurent, France,
overlooking Omaha Beach, rests the following plaque: "In memory
of General Dwight D. Eisenhower and the forces under his command
this sealed capsule containing news reports of the June 6, 1944
Normandy Landings is placed here by the newsmen who were there."6
This simple remembrance represents a sincere expression of mutual
respect and shared experience often seen in the genre of the war
correspondent from all conflicts; it is not a reflection of
unquestioning support or "cheerleading" for the attack.
General Walter E. Boomer, the commander of Marine Forces
during the Persian Gulf War, has said that among commanders there
is a "mythology" of mistrust despite the fact that relatively few
have ever had sustained contact with the news media.7 Often this
is because the two institutions generally have very little
dealings with each other except during crises or war. Aside from
reporters who cover the Pentagon, there are very few journalists
who specialize in military and national security issues; and
their numbers are decreasing as the trend continues toward
reporters with "general" expertise. Further, most reporters don't
have the time or support to visit and learn about the military,
even during exercises.
Interestingly, given this history of unfamiliarity, both the

military and the news media expect the other to perform with
understanding and efficiency when events bring them together.
Further, while reporters on the ground focus immense effort on
covering the military unit, their presence is only one of the
many variables competing for the attention of the responsible
commander. When things don't go well, minor irritants grow into
major issues, and, unfortunately, the two institutions often tend
to focus on their mutual competition rather than on their shared
responsibility to communicate information to the public. Once
again, the fact that both institutions speak to a common audience
should lead to cooperation based on mutual interest instead of
confrontation often based on stereotypes or past disagreements
and misunderstandings.
Yet the differences in institutional perspective are
important to understand. Increasingly, reporters see themselves
as participants in the events they cover, not merely as
chroniclers of those experiences. In the post-cold war world,
national leaders and agenda setters regularly appear on
international television networks like CNN and the BBC to
communicate diplomatic messages and warnings. This practice is
also true, although perhaps less dramatically, for radio and
print media. Additionally, during the Persian Gulf War, one of
the "status symbols" among reporters was the number of prisoners
of war each was able to "capture." The increasing role of the
news media in outlining the public agenda has led to debate over
the apparent linkage between news media coverage of events,
especially in television and still pictures, and the decision of
nations to act in response. Recent examples include international
efforts during Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq,
humanitarian assistance to the former Soviet Union, Operation
Restore Hope in Somalia, and various actions in the former
Yugoslavia, as well as the pace of the domestic response to the
Hurricane Andrew disaster in Florida.
An unexpected military consequence of this new role involves
providing security for reporters covering an operation. While
journalists say that their security is not a military concern and
DoD policy calls for working with journalists without regard for
their safety, events have proven otherwise.8 Participants in
conflicts are becoming increasingly sensitive to the perception
that news coverage often leads to unwanted external intervention.
Thus what can be interpreted as retaliatory actions have been
taken against reporters to include bounties for those covering
U.N. operations in the former Yugoslavia. More than 30
journalists have been killed in fighting there since 1991, and
four reporters died in Somalia on July 12,1993 in what has been
characterized as an act of revenge by an angry mob. News media
demands for assistance when reporters were trapped in hotels in
Panama City (1989) and Mogadishu (1993) and after the capture of
Bob Simon of CBS Television by Iraqi forces (1991) clearly
indicate that the security of journalists will remain a
persistent, high visibility issue confronting commanders.

While absolute security cannot be guaranteed, those
reporters who accept the protection afforded by military units
are probably in the best position to cover the story
comprehensively and survive. Yet the situations above, especially
that of Simon, involved conscious decisions by reporters to
function outside of the established news media relations
procedures and to conduct reporting entirely on their own. In
response to such behavior, commanders who understand that
sustained contacts between military forces and the news media
result in the most complete and accurate stories about their
units should seek to convince reporters that the acceptance of
reasonable military ground rules and the integration of
journalists into operational units are in the best interests of
both institutions. However, it is inevitable that some reporters
will choose not to cooperate. In those cases, commanders have no
special responsibilities for such individuals and should,
instead, focus their attention on the reporters who desire to
abide by the procedures outlined for the operation.
Any discussion of contacts between the military and the news
media must address the expectations of reporters covering the
operation. Logically, journalists are limited by the same factors
of terrain, visibility and information flow that affect the
forces with which they travel. Yet reporters don't always
understand this. In his book on the Persian Gulf War, John
MacArthur, the publisher of Harper's Magazine, quotes Molly Moore
of The Washington Post as saying, "I had no idea what was going
on, and I was right in the middle of the war" (traveling with
Marine commander LTG Boomer).9 Precisely so! A critical step in
developing cooperation between the military and the news media is
the explanation of the reality that the mere presence of
journalists, regardless of background, will not grant special
insight not available to the military personnel they are with.
Once again, dialogue and explanation improve the quality of the
reporters' experience and, inevitably, of their news products.
News Media Access.
Major General Paul E. Funk has written that, on returning
from the desert, "I was upset to find that people did not know
that the 3d Armored Division (his command) and VII Corps had been
in a very heavy fight under great contact with some of the
enemy's first-rate units. The story was not told well enough
about the people who did the fighting—the companies, platoons and
task forces. . . . Invariably, if you allow the media to look at
what you are doing and put them with the soldiers, it comes out
fine."10
Both the military and the news media share an interest in
providing a more complete picture of military operations than is
available at a news briefing. This can best be accomplished by
ensuring personal contact between the members of the force and
reporters covering the story. Such access is important from the

news media's perspective because the information available at
news conferences communicates only part of the total story.
Similarly, for commanders, there is no more effective way to meet
their obligations to communicate with the public than through the
perspectives and the experiences of the members of their
commands. Yet while commanders have a responsibility to assist
journalists in gaining access to military forces, the large
number of reporters who inevitably appear in an operational area
make it impossible to accommodate them all simultaneously.
After the Persian Gulf War, Pete Williams, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, and his staff met with
various news media representatives and developed guidelines for
the coverage of DoD operations. The first of these directly
addresses the issue of access. In contrast to the news media
pools which were necessary in the environment of Operation Desert
Storm, the first guideline states that "open and independent
reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S.
military operations."11 Essentially, this recognizes the practice
of individual journalists moving about an area of options and
reporting for their own news organizations without sharing their
information with their colleagues, a central feature of pool
operations.
In fact, this principle is an acknowledgement of reality,
not an operational objective. As the events on the beach at
Mogadishu, Somalia, clearly revealed, the news media have
essentially solved the primary issue of access. In most cases,
commanders can assume that reporters will be in position to cover
any military activity from the earliest stages. In recent
history, this has resulted in images of military personnel
performing their tasks while surrounded by reporters who often
seem to be regarding them as objects of curiosity. These
situations can be as harmless as organized visits to forward
positions where tactically deployed combat units become
overwhelmed by reporters taking advantage of a photo opportunity;
or they can be as potentially dangerous as on the beach in
Somalia where the cultures of the military and the news media
converged in their most dramatic collision.
The more relevant challenge for commanders is to decide how
to include reporters within their organizations. This is
particularly true for the Army and the Marine Corps because the
story resides with those who execute the mission, and reporters
will find their way to the widely-dispersed units who are
performing various tasks far from the "influence" of the public
affairs staff. Air fields and ships are far less accessible
without military assistance. Once again, it is clearly not
possible to accommodate simultaneously every journalist desiring
to cover the operation. During Operation Desert Storm, one
assessment called for the inclusion of 13 reporters in an Army
division.12 In future operations, circumstances may allow for
more or dictate fewer.

While inclusion represents the most volatile flashpoint in
the relationship between the military and the news media, it also
offers the best opportunity for the dialogue necessary for the
most effective reporting and understanding. Journalists who are
assigned to operational units bring to life the dry facts of the
news conference by providing the texture, explanation, and
context of what is going on. Further, they communicate a human
face by telling the stories of those directly involved with the
mission. It has become increasingly true that such reporting is
often the only contact most Americans have with the men and women
who make up their military establishment.
In every case, commanders must address two related
questions: How many reporters can I include in my unit without
degrading its operational effectiveness? and, How do I
accommodate those journalists who merely appear in a unit area
with the desire to report on its activities? A credible answer to
the first question reduces the complexity of the second.13
Reporters working outside a unit possess limited utility as they
are only able to gather images of what is happening and provide
their own interpretations. Those included in the units are
valuable to both the news media and the military as they tend to
produce more accurate, complete, and informative stories because
of their access to those who are performing the mission.
The first hours of Operation Restore Hope (December 1992)
provide a useful example. In the wake of the controversy about
the landing at Mogadishu, it is important to remember that those
reporters on the beach, squinting into the darkness and
transmitting shadows, had not coordinated with the joint task
force and were essentially outside of the story. In fact, it is
probable that the careless use of lights resulted from a basic
misunderstanding of military requirements. In contrast, the
public affairs plan included more than 20 journalists who spent
several days with the Marines in preparation for the operation
and actually participated in the amphibious assault.
Once ashore, efforts began to include the "outsiders," such
as by arranging interviews with network anchors perched on the
roof of the local airport. This action answered the second
question by accommodating those who waited for the force to come
to them. Thus the complete media relations plan was flexible
enough to include, when events permitted, those journalists who
were unable or unwilling to join the Marines before coming
ashore. For the commander and the public affairs staff, the task
is to achieve inclusiveness, not to grant preference.
Thus it would seem that, once an operation begins, the
priority effort for the public affairs staff should involve
establishing an identifiable information center, appropriate to
the situation, to sustain the efforts of those journalists
accompanying the units and to communicate with those journalists
outside of the operation. Initially, the facility may consist of
no more than an officer and NCO with a satellite telephone around

which to build a larger structure. That is sufficient as long as
reinforcing personnel and resources arrive at a pace to prevent
them from being overwhelmed by the information demand. Such a
step ensures that a credible media relations infrastructure is in
place which increases the efficiency of the reporting process and
reduces the chances of having uninformed and uncooperative
journalists disrupting the operation.
In any case, commanders should remain sensitive to the fact
that all journalists are increasingly capable of employing
sophisticated technology to provide real time coverage of
military activities. Therefore, it is important to have public
affairs and operational personnel available to furnish brief, but
effective, explanations to provide context to the transmitted
images and reports. Without such command assistance, there is a
chance that misperceptions and misunderstandings can result and
that efforts to clarify them can seriously detract from the
communications objectives for the mission.
For example, a simple survey of TV network newscasts and
daily newspapers reveals that most regularly present identical
video and still images of the events in the former Yugoslavia.14
What sets off specific stories as particularly interesting or
compelling are those from journalists on the scene. "Raw" video
of operational events, without explanation, doesn't inform very
effectively. Once again, today's technology often moves images
faster than journalists can provide context, possibly distorting
the perceptions of those who view them. A commander's deliberate
plan to include journalists reduces the chances for
misunderstanding and assists in raising the quality of the
reporting and the level of public understanding.
The most effective news media relations programs will be
those which provide the widest variety of experiences. While the
efforts of "frontline" units may appear to be the most dramatic,
the news media and, ultimately, the public are best served by
gaining an appreciation for the complexity of all the tasks
performed by the force. Additionally, the operational story is
best told by shedding the "zero defects" mentality and by
exposing reporters to every aspect of the mission and letting
them appreciate that military operations are tough challenges
where the shape of the final outcome is seldom clear. Making it
look easy raises news media and public expectations for future
successes and establishes standards which may not be possible to
meet. Sounding a theme similar to MG Funk's, Molly Moore provides
perspective by writing, "to the men and women who fought it and
the commanders who directed it, there was nothing easy about the
ground war."15 Arguably, that story about the "doers" is the most
important of any operation and the one which commanders can most
affect positively.
Another aspect of the discussion of inclusion concerns
escorts. The expectation that all journalists will be accompanied
by trained public affairs personnel is unrealistic. In the first

place, there are not enough to match up with the large numbers of
journalists who will cover military operations. This was
especially true during the large scale efforts of Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm; and it was certainly the case in
Somalia where the public affairs staff would have had to land
before the assault force to ensure a public affairs presence (not
a reasonable course of action). Further, public affairs
personnel are probably not the most qualified to act as escorts
because it is unlikely that they will have the expertise to
explain the activities of the diverse units participating in the
operation.
The sixth guideline for combat coverage addresses this
issue: "Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons
but should not interfere with the reporting process."16 The
thrust of this principle is that the responsibility of the public
affairs staff is to assist the news media by arranging for their
inclusion in operational units and to prepare those units for
their arrival. The requirements for navigation, security and
logistical support establish the need for escort assistance, but
both institutions are best served by having members of the unit
serve those functions. These arrangements need not necessarily
place special demands on the commander. Reporters can move
forward with supply columns or with any transport which
inevitably shuttles among organizations in an area of operation.
Journalists are there to cover the functioning of the unit, not
to impose upon it as visitors or inspectors.
Technology and Support For The News Media Relations Mission.
What is more remarkable about reporters than their numbers
is their range of technological capabilities, and commanders have
become properly wary about the implications of the live reporting
of military activities. In early December 1992, Pete Williams and
Dave Bartlett, the president of the Radio and Television News
Directors Association, discussed the likelihood of live
battlefield or operational coverage before a group of military
public affairs officers. While each proposed different timelines
(Williams predicted 4-5 years; Bartlett 2-3), they agreed that
such an event was not imminent. Yet it was only one week and one
hour later that the lights went on at Mogadishu beach as the
Marine Reconnaissance Force came ashore, demonstrating the fast
pace and unpredictability of advances in technology.
It seems that technology has always been central to the
relationship of the military and the news media. The Civil War
brought the telegraph which raised serious concerns about the
security of troop movements and operations. Carrier pigeons later
added a different dimension to news coverage as reporters sent
dispatches tied to pigeons' legs. Today, experience teaches that
the news media bring with them sophisticated communications
equipment, computers, and television and radio resources.
Especially in the earliest stages of an operation, they appear

with equipment demonstrating superior capabilities which they can
deploy faster and sustain longer than those available to military
public affairs staffs. This results in situations in which
commanders lag behind the news media in telling the story of
their operational efforts.
Legitimate concerns over today's technology recall those
expressed about the telegraph 130 years ago. During Operation
Desert Storm, controversy arose over the movement of news
products, both print and broadcast, from forward deployed
reporters to transmission sites in the rear. Current and emerging
technologies are no longer tied to arrangements which depend on
ground or air transportation. Radio and television signals can be
sent over satellite equipment which is increasingly easy to move
about the operational area and set up to provide real time
coverage. Continuous broadcast transmission capabilities exist
using available satellites, and commanders can expect to confront
such sophistication today. Emerging technology is resulting in
smaller cameras, editing equipment and uplink facilities which
will be even easier to deploy, employ and sustain. Cumbersome
television satellite equipment which had to be transported on
aircraft pallets to Panama and in pickup trucks in the desert
soon will be carried in a few small cases by a reporter and
photographer. In areas where the infrastructure exists,
television images can already be sent over cellular telephones;
similar radio capabilities have existed for several years using
satellite and cellular telephones.
Immediate reporting capabilities also exist for print
reporters who are capable of transmitting news products from
their portable computers through satellite telephones to their
newsrooms in the United States. Kirk Spitzer of USA Today
demonstrated this capability on July 20, 1993, using the
satellite telephone assigned to the Department of Defense
National Media Pool. Major national and international wire news
services also possess and deploy this technology. While print
reports may appear to lack the immediate drama of still pictures
or video, they are regularly picked up and broadcast by radio and
television networks. In fact, a print report, transmitted through
a 60 pound satellite telephone uplink, may become the trigger for
broader news media coverage. Recall also that CNN's dramatic
reports from Baghdad, Iraq, on the first night of Operation
Desert Storm were sent by telephone; the pictures were added days
later.
Of particular concern at the operational and strategic
levels is the interest the television networks have expressed in
acquiring and broadcasting images obtained from satellite
overflights. This capability, demonstrated during coverage of the
Persian Gulf War, could be a significant factor during sensitive
military operations. As with any technological capability,
seeking control over the employment of satellite imagery is
largely a futile effort. What is necessary is continuous, candid
dialogue with individual reporters and news organizations so that

they clearly understand the consequences of reporting information
which violates operational coverage ground rules and which could
jeopardize the outcome of the mission or the safety of the force.
The technological capabilities of the news media are an
operational fact of life for the commander and public affairs
staff as they prepare for the media relations mission. While it
is not always necessary to understand fully the functioning of
such technology, it is important to recognize that, even in the
most austere conditions, information moves from journalist to
medium (wire service bulletin, television report, newspaper
story, radio broadcast) at incredible speeds. Therefore, it is
often true that the most pressing task of communicating through
the news media is to be able to provide timely detail and context
so that the ultimate audiences can understand, as nearly as
possible, the facts and implications of any story. This means
that the military must also field a credible technological
capability.17
Those responsible for communicating with the news media must
possess the freshest public affairs guidance and unclassified
operational information to respond effectively. To do so, public
affairs staffs should be equipped with satellite and, as
appropriate, cellular telephones; facsimile machines; data
transmission devices; and secure transmission means. Currently
they are not. Without these capabilities, those designated to
communicate with reporters could find themselves the least
informed about current situations, and commanders could find
their operational efforts characterized as uncoordinated and
their spokespersons portrayed as confused. Resulting doubts about
the effectiveness of military activities can severely limit the
commander's ability to communicate effectively and result in
intense efforts to regain credibility rather than disciplined
programs to sustain it.
The cost of purchasing current technology is severe for both
the military and the news media and often prevents commanders
from obtaining the necessary equipment. The acquisition process
begins with a complete assessment of necessary capabilities and a
survey of the technology available to support the news media
relations mission. It may be found that the leasing of technology
is more practical than the actual purchase. There are several
advantages to this approach. First, leasing will generally be
less expensive, resulting in lower fixed costs. Additionally,
leasing offers flexibility as mixes of necessary technology can
be developed to support specific missions. Finally, this approach
assures that the most current technology is available. Purchased
equipment becomes obsolescent rather quickly; establishing and
updating leases for capabilities will ensure that commanders are
best able to communicate through the news media.
But technology is merely an aspect of the larger issue of
support. Like the other operational functions, those performing
news media relations tasks must be able to deploy, concentrate

essential resources and communicate in those areas most central
to the public's understanding of the military mission. Once the
point(s) of maximum news media interest has been identified, the
commander should assign a high priority to respond to that
interest. To borrow a sports analogy, the effort to engage the
news media using a man-to-man, matchup "defense" is futile; there
are simply too many of them. By establishing responsive resource
"zones," commanders can accommodate reporters who enter their
areas of responsibility and then pass them on to other
commanders. This approach also provides the flexibility to manage
surges of journalists at particular points of interest by
shifting assets from less committed areas. This can only be done
if commanders are thinking forward and preparing in advance to
establish an infrastructure which provides trained public affairs
personnel with appropriate communications, transportation, and
logistics assets.
This requirement is particularly challenging as no
organization, regardless of size, can accomplish this task
without reinforcement. Most importantly, all support should be
provided on a dedicated basis since it is impractical to rely on
those assets deployed for other operational tasks which are often
given higher priorities. Thus the planning process must specify
the public affairs support requirements, identify the sources
(components, supporting CINCs, the Military Departments), and
deploy the resources at a pace to meet the information
requirements of the journalists on the ground.
To enhance their news media relations plans, commanders,
especially those at the operational level, must also have access
to timely summaries of print and broadcast reports prepared by
the news media. In the earliest stages of an operation, the daily
transmission of the Early Bird news summary product from the
Pentagon should meet this requirement. As the operation matures,
providing this capability will be a major challenge as it
requires current technology such as facsimile machines, wire
service printers, television and radio sets, and downlink
facilities to obtain the necessary reports.
Commanders at every level should be interested in what is
being said about their efforts. Those at the tactical level will
often learn of these from the reporters integrated with their
units or from news summaries several days old. They don't have to
like or agree with what is being said about them, but they do
have to understand what is being reported. After all, the public
obtains its information about the operation from the news media,
and those reports help to shape public perceptions and opinion
about the command's effectiveness. An efficient media relations
program is aware of any differences between what the command
knows to be true and what the news media are reporting. Relying
on technology, their own assessments, and their news media
relations plans, commanders and their public affairs staffs have
to work continuously to ensure that the inevitable gap is as
narrow as possible.

In an exercise environment, commanders and their public
affairs staffs are usually able to establish and operate such
complete infrastructures, but that is often after several years
of preparation. The track record is not as successful when the
planning and deployment time frames are compressed to a few days
as in a crisis. To date, for instance, there has never been a
consistent solution for establishing communications with public
affairs personnel in the earliest stages of an operation.18
Public affairs staffs have had to rely on borrowing satellite
phones from reporters (Somalia) or struggling with undependable
indigenous communications systems as in Macedonia where only 12
commercial international telephone lines exist (July 1993). Thus
it is necessary that all contingency planning specifically
identifies the necessary assets and builds their movement into
all deployment schedules. Timeliness is particularly important
because, as discussed, reporters will probably be in the area of
operations when the forces arrive. Failure to anticipate and
respond to this presence will shift the initiative to the news
media and distract the commander who then must expend
considerable effort to catch up rather than to communicate as an
equal partner in the process.
By maximizing their technology, creating their own logistics
support, and renting their own vehicles (as witnessed in the
desert, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and elsewhere), it
appears that the news media have met most of their own resource
requirements. Yet commanders can always assume that journalists
will call upon them to provide specific assistance such as
medical care or potable water. Commanders should anticipate these
situations and develop response strategies. Such planning will
also be a factor when unique requirements evolve such as during
those contingencies which call for chemical protection equipment.
Furthermore, while commanders should focus their primary
support efforts on their own public affairs infrastructure, a
review of the guidelines for the coverage of DoD operations
reveals some responsibility for supporting the news media. In
those situations in which "open and independent reporting" is the
norm, military communications, transportation, and logistical
support should be provided on a space-available basis.19 There
are, however, other factors which affect such support. For
instance, when transmission security is a factor, commanders may
establish a ground rule that reporters will use available
military communications to file their stories. If discussed in
advance, this arrangement would probably work, but increased
priority must be given to those stories to ensure timeliness and
reduce suspicion. Similarly, commanders may find it desirable to
provide journalists with transportation to avoid having
brightly-colored, light-reflective rental vehicles accompany
ground forces. Each of these is situationally dependent and will
require individual judgments. In those cases when it is necessary
to form news media pools, commanders assume full responsibility
for news media support.20 This reality and the demands it would

place on limited resources should guide commanders as they assess
the need for such pools.
News Media Relations Support Structure.
Organizing for the media relations mission requires the same
disciplined planning as any other operational task. As noted
earlier, failure to do so limits the response capabilities of the
command and can result in underinformed news reports which can
misrepresent the direction and effectiveness of the military
effort. This lack of preparation serves neither the military
forces nor the reporters sent to cover them. Thus it is not
unusual to find that reporters are equally interested in ensuring
that procedures and facilities exist to facilitate effective news
coverage.
Support efforts for both the public affairs staff and the
news media merge at the information bureau established by the
commander and subordinate to the command's public affairs
officer. This will generally be a Joint Information Bureau (JIB)
which supports the Joint Task Force commander; component
commanders should also set up service-unique facilities to
represent their own roles in the larger effort and to assist
journalists seeking to visit forward units. In those operations
conducted with international coalition or alliance partners,
commanders will operate Combined or Allied Press Information
Centers (CIB/APIC). Regardless of type, these facilities serve as
the primary source of information, transportation,
communications, and logistical support for all aspects of the
media relations mission.
Reporters entering an area of operations will normally seek
out a JIB, CIB, or APIC to obtain information about the
developing situation and to request assistance in gaining access
to the deployed forces. Contingency planning should set the
establishment of the information bureau as a priority mission
with the deployment pace of necessary resources tied to the
assessed level of news media interest. The size of the public
affairs effort should be linked to the anticipated news media
presence, not to the size of the military force. Thus in June and
July of 1993, the public affairs challenge was to develop a
public affairs presence appropriate to the news media coverage of
the initial deployment of U.S. forces into Macedonia; the fact
that the force of 300 ground troops would not normally require
public affairs support was not a factor. The arrival of 20
members of the Berlin Brigade on July 5, 1993 triggered
considerable international news coverage, with video images
appearing very quickly on CNN. Additionally, each course of
action should allow for surges of news media interest at various
locations within the area of operation and at specific times in
the movement of the force (recall that the coverage from
Macedonia faded soon after the arrival of the main body of
troops).

Such situations could be addressed with the efficient
deployment and employment of whatever support resources are
available. For instance, the British media plan for Operation
Desert Storm called for the placement of a Forward Transmission
Unit (FTU) in the vicinity of their division headquarters. It
consisted of processing and uplink capabilities for both still
and video products which greatly reduced the transmission time
between the FTU and permanent facilities located outside the area
of operations. Though often subjected to a system of security
review more restrictive than that imposed by U.S. forces, British
journalists were able to provide timely and dramatic reports
without venturing very far from the units to which they were
assigned.
Operations Security (OPSEC).
Logically, technology which allows for the real time
reporting of military activities has enormous implications for
OPSEC. The December 9, 1992 beach scene in Somalia represented
the essence of every commander's fears over the violation of
operations security. The news media have since accused the
military of overreaction because there were no negative
consequences. In fact, one television producer claimed that the
use of lights was an act of deterrence because any hostile gunmen
could clearly see the imposing nature of the forces coming
ashore.21 This "no harm, no foul" justification is of no solace.
That no one was attacked or injured was because of variables
beyond the control of both the military and the news media. Quite
simply, the event was benign only because no gunman decided to
take advantage of the illuminated target area containing both the
U.S. Marines and the news media whose coverage had helped to
bring them there.
Yet there are other troublesome, though less obvious,
examples of OPSEC violations. At 2:30 PM on January 13, 1993,
White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater announced that Allied
aircraft had attacked a variety of air defense facilities in
Southern Iraq 75 minutes earlier. Little of his information about
this classified operation was new. That was because two hours
earlier, the Reuters News Service had broken the story that the
attack had been launched; this report originated in Washington,
DC, not on the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk or from some unidentified
airbase. For the next two hours, CNN and others competed to
provide details about the attack by calling on their various
military experts. They were able to provide disturbingly accurate
reports of the numbers of aircraft and the types and locations of
targets. After Fitzwater's announcement, the only fresh
information about the attack and, most specifically, those who
conducted it flowed from journalists embarked on the aircraft
carrier. Much of that reporting was quite good, reinforcing the
importance of including reporters with the force.

During the "CBS Evening News" on June 16, 1993, National
Security Correspondent David Martin, drawing on his well-placed
sources, presented a remarkably complete outline of the U.N.
operation against a warlord in Mogadishu, Somalia. This action
differed from the earlier example because Martin's report aired
after the operation began. Under similar conditions several days
earlier, Jamie Mclntyre, CNN's Military Affairs Correspondent,
and the CNN staff delayed the reporting of operational
information they had obtained because of concern that to do so
could directly warn the target of the U.N. effort. Although
perhaps not up to military OPSEC standards, each demonstrates
sensitivity to military security concerns.
While most journalists would not compromise OPSEC
intentionally, there is always the chance for an inadvertent
release of information by inexperienced or careless journalists.
It seems inevitable that information will leak, and journalists
understandably believe that they are being given information so
that it can be reported. It simply makes no sense to provide
classified information to journalists and expect that they will
secure it for you. There will be cases, especially at the
strategic and operational levels, where "senior officials" will
provide sensitive information to assist reporters in telling the
complete story, but only after they have agreed to withhold its
release until after a time specified in the ground rules or
provided the reporters will remain with the unit until OPSEC
concerns are no longer relevant to the specific situation
(operational and tactical levels).
Because of the pervasiveness of news media presence, the
speed of technology, and the apparent inevitably of information
leaks at the strategic level, traditional efforts at ensuring
OPSEC are being overtaken by events beyond the control of
commanders. This is especially true at the operational and
tactical levels where intelligence and sensitive information are
the most perishable. The solution to much of the concern over
security of information lies in a comprehensive plan for the
inclusion of news media, reinforced by ground rules and supported
by procedures for providing explanation and context about the
sensitivity and complexity of the military actions. Penalties for
OPSEC violations are also important.
In establishing OPSEC parameters and outlining the
consequences of reporting sensitive information, both the
military and the news media should consider the following
questions: Would the release or reporting of specific information
assist the enemy in being more prepared than he would have been
otherwise? Would it compromise a deception plan? Identify the
main effort? Are the facts the military is providing or the news
media are gathering merely helpful in understanding the complete
story, or are they central to the success of the operation? In
other words, would the disclosure of this information affect the
course of events?

Applying these standards to the earlier examples, it would
appear that the intense coverage before the airstrike in January
posed a significant threat to OPSEC, while the release of details
once the U.N. operations began was less likely to influence the
outcome. That none of the reports apparently affected the course
of events is not relevant; a benign result does not justify the
reporting of information whose knowledge could have changed the
outcome. Prior notification could increase enemy preparedness and
should be a matter of common concern for both the news media and
the military.
Journalists often argue that some events, such as the
launching of aircraft, are clearly visible to any observer and
that their reporting could probably be matched by a phone call by
an enemy agent. Perhaps, but it is also very likely that the
"real time" reporting by radio and television could reach the
enemy's decision makers much faster and more efficiently than a
phone call, once again confirming the importance of technology.
It is clear that the mere presence of a reporter in an
operational area exposes that person to important information.
Further, it is apparent that a journalist can only report the
complete story if provided background information to understand
the full context. Personal acquaintance and trust may often
ensure that sensitive information is not revealed. When such
credibility does not exist, it may well be that certain reporters
can be told little or nothing in advance. To preclude doubt or
the possibility of confusion, specific ground rules should be
developed in each situation to identify that information of
concern and specify the parameters for its release.
The fourth Guideline For The Coverage of DoD Operations
addresses both the establishment of ground rules and the need for
sanctions should they be violated.22 The facts that both
institutions have acknowledged that security concerns are
important enough to establish reasonable limits on reporting and
that suspension and expulsion can be legitimate remedies if these
are ignored encourage commanders and their staffs to outline a
set of ground rules appropriate to the mission and to make them
central to the inclusion arrangements with the news media.
There has been considerable discussion about the need for
the "Security Review" of news products to ensure that ground
rules are not violated. No mention of this issue is made in the
guidelines because the DoD and news media representatives could
not agree on wording that was acceptable. Thus there will always
be the potential for controversy. In the wake of the Persian Gulf
War, to date, there have been no instances of security review.
However, commanders have periodically mandated that news stories
be embargoed (delayed) as part of the ground rules until an
operation has passed its most critical moment. The exceptional
reports from those journalists deployed on the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk
on January 13, 1993, embargoed until after the White House
announcement, represent a classic success story.

There are new standards for OPSEC emerging. For example, the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff conducted a detailed operational briefing several days
before the Marines arrived in Somalia. That session reflected an
awareness that openness or transparency of action were more
appropriate than steps to conceal information. Logically, each
situation will require commanders to tailor specific ground rules
to their assigned mission. Those for a combat operation (Desert
Storm) probably won't resemble those for humanitarian assistance
(Somalia), and certainly won't look anything like those for
disaster relief (Florida).
Education and Training.
Both the military and the news media are woefully deficient
in their knowledge of the other institution and in their training
for those tasks necessary to make and report news during a
military operation. What is particularly alarming about this
situation is that the personalities of those involved in the
relationship have a huge impact on the success of the media
relations mission. While the military can only directly affect
its own behavior, it has a stake in improving the level of news
media understanding and including them in realistic exercise
scenarios. With fewer opportunities to serve in the military and
the continuing trend in the news media to generalists, the
cultural gap between the military and the news media can only
widen. It is important to understand, however, that the news
media are concerned about their own deficiencies.23
Because they want to retain their most experienced reporters
at the Pentagon and at the theater headquarters, news media
decision makers will send their best qualified nonmilitary
experts to cover the troops in the field.24 Thus commanders and
their public affairs staffs must prepare to accommodate reporters
with limited expertise in situations of great stress and
uncertainty. At other times, such as in educational settings and
during exercises, it is in the best interest of both institutions
to increase contact, mutual understanding and trust and to
decrease suspicion. At the tactical and operational levels, the
most likely venues for those least experienced, reporters should
understand military organizations and basic military doctrine. As
often as possible they should train with military forces to
develop their own field skills, determine their personal
equipment needs, and come to understand how individuals function
together to form effective units which work to achieve assigned
objectives.
Of greatest importance to the success of the military's news
media relations program is the commander's commitment to be as
accepting of close news media scrutiny during an operation as of
the favorable publicity available during an exercise. They are
dramatically different environments. During an exercise,

reporters tend to focus on the efforts of units to perfect their
operational skills, and there is more time to explain, educate
and inform journalists about what they are experiencing. Further,
most stories are features which tend to be favorable in tone. By
contrast, the tension and pace associated with operational
deployments do not always allow for the cordial relationships
typically associated with exercises. Questions and requests for
information, normally welcomed by the military during exercises
as opportunities to explain, are often legitimately regarded as
unwelcome distractions during an operation and can create
friction among those involved. Additionally, the uncertainty of
operational situations not governed by structured exercise
scenarios can result in stories which are not as comfortable or
as forgiving as those from exercises.
In an adaptation of a familiar principle, commanders should
ensure that exercise scenarios cause their organizations to train
as they would communicate in an actual contingency. More
specifically, it is imperative that commanders prepare themselves
and their units to communicate operationally by exercising those
specific tasks most related to the media relations mission. This
begins by ensuring that public affairs personnel have roles to
play in both command post exercises, which hone assessment,
planning, and response skills, and live field training exercises
where the logistical support of the news media is a central
feature.
Even in the absence of a dedicated public affairs scenario,
media relations training is an integral part of any command post
exercise. Since virtually every event, issue, plan, and decision
contains some public affairs aspects, commanders and their staffs
should derive exercise news media "play" from the rest of the
exercise flow. Without the need to actually communicate with
reporters, commanders and their public affairs staffs can
increase their proficiency in assessing the public affairs
implications of evolving courses of action, develop and
coordinate appropriate guidance, issue exercise news releases,
and "establish" and equip information bureaus. A CPX can also
assist commanders in becoming comfortable with reviewing and, as
appropriate, responding to events and perceptions reported
through the news media (an aspect which should be built into
every exercise scenario). Additionally, the kind of precise
staffing necessary for the development and deployment of public
affairs resources can best take place in the CPX environment. The
staging of an exercise news conference, to include preparation
and rehearsal, would also be useful because, after all, such
sessions have become standard features of every operational
deployment.
If well-conceived, many of the irritants which appear during
actual deployments should reveal themselves during exercises.
That they often do not is evidence of the artificiality often
seen in public affairs exercise efforts. It is understandable
that live exercise planning generally focuses on a few

highly-visible and interesting events to attract reporters who
may not otherwise have the inclination or the time to attend. Yet
the support for journalists who participate should go beyond
rehearsed exercise briefings and the observation of those events
from areas marked off by white engineer tape. The exercise
reliance on elaborate information facilities; numerous
telephones, facsimile machines and photocopiers; vans, buses, and
on-call helicopters; and full public affairs staffs is often
artificial and can create expectations that such support is
always appropriate and, more naively, always available.
Generally, this is not relevant training because of its
artificiality. As with any operational task, exercise
organizations, equipment and procedures for news media relations
should be adapted to resemble as closely as possible those
required for an actual mission. The administrative treatment of
reporters should not be confused with the demands of news media
relations during an actual deployment.
Journalists attending exercises should be treated as they
would when they arrive to cover military forces conducting any
mission along the continuum of operations. They should be
informed of the activities of all units involved in the exercise;
included in the normal functioning of those units to the extent
that they actually live with them for several days; transported
in organic tactical vehicles; and encouraged to conduct
interviews and file stories. To the extent possible, such an
approach can yield a sense of common effort which echoes the
shared experience of those war correspondents who came ashore at
Normandy. Like military forces, those journalists who have
experienced rigorous training deployments, such as to the
National Training Center, speak coherently and enthusiastically
of their new understanding and increased skill proficiency. Such
positive response should be reinforced through sustained contacts
between the military and journalists.
Various initiatives have sought to assist journalists in
understanding the complexities of military life and of military
operations. The annual "Media Days" at the various war colleges
and the periodic appearance of journalists before military
audiences generally result in brief epiphanies of understanding,
but they seldom survive the pressures of an actual deployment.
Thus a broader agenda of training opportunities like those
outlined earlier and detailed background briefings during actual
operations will always be needed to ensure that journalists are
prepared to the extent possible to cover the story. More
accurate, complete and interesting stories will result as
reporters learn about and understand the military culture and how
it functions.
Additionally, the military can only benefit from increased
exposure to journalists. It is vitally important that these
experiences are balanced in their presentation and not geared to
reinforce stereotypes. An Associated Press story, in May 1993,
reported that training in Germany to prepare U.S. troops to

deploy to the former Yugoslavia included "`reporters and
cameramen' who pop up and try to make the soldiers say something
outrageous."25 The training technique is sound, but its tone
could be unnecessarily threatening. While meetings with
journalists can be stressful and risky, the vast majority of such
encounters will be simple conversations, constrained by OPSEC
concerns, designed to obtain information to produce news stories.
Efforts to reduce the fear and distrust of journalists are far
more useful than those that reinforce the myth that the role of
the news media is to undermine the military effort and to
discredit the members of the force.
Media relations training, most often emphasizing the
principle of "Security at the Source," is necessary for those
operating at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and
should be provided in both service schools and exercise
environments. The dialogue between the military and the news
media is not simply the concern of the public affairs staff. In
fact, such dialogue is less important to reporters who are
increasingly interested in speaking directly with those making
the decisions and performing the tasks of the operation. The
early realization and acceptance of that fact argue strongly for
a broad-based orientation to the news media and energetic
scenarios which develop and exercise skills necessary to sustain
the dialogue.
Any training agenda must consider the increasingly
international character of security missions and news media
coverage. In the wake of the controversy over the beach scene in
Mogadishu, one explanation offered by the news media was that it
was only the foreign journalists who were using lights. Such
explanations are nonsense, and such distinctions are no longer
relevant. Commanders and their public affairs staffs must be
sensitive to the reality of full international coverage as
represented by CNN, the BBC World Service (radio and, now,
television), SkyNews (British), and Reuters television. Of
course, various wire services (notably Reuters and the Associated
Press) have long had international impact, but never to the
degree generated by contemporary broadcast news media. Yet
Americans in several cities awoke on July 6, 1993 to front page
pictures (some in color) of U.S. troops arriving in Macedonia.
The source of those photographs emphasized the international
nature of news: they were provided by Agence France-Presse.
Recent experience has also taught much about the challenges
of working with public information officials (the international
term) from other nations. In addition to Coalition efforts in
Desert Shield/Storm and Somalia (before and during the U.N.
mission), American public affairs personnel have participated
with their NATO allies during Operation Southern Guard (the NATO
response during the Persian Gulf War), the naval blockade of
Serbia and Montenegro, and Operation Deny Flight over
Bosnia-Hercegovina. In the past, only the United States and
Canada have fielded trained public affairs/public information

personnel; that is no longer true. Several NATO nations have
developed strong cadres of public information specialists with
experience in NATO, U.N., WEU (Western European Union), and other
combined operations. This relationship is further complicated by
new information initiatives from the Russian Federation and other
nations with whom the United States has not maintained
traditional contacts. Training programs and exercise scenarios
must be developed to ensure the most efficient possible coverage
of those international military operations in which the United
States will play important roles.
Missions and Messages.
Once again, virtually every military activity will have
public affairs implications because of news media and public
interest; this is true even if OPSEC and other factors dictate
that no public discussion is possible other than a standard
disclaimer about not discussing security measures or future
operations. Regardless of mission, commanders can expect the
predeployment and deployment phases to attract considerable news
media attention. This fact offers commanders and their public
affairs staffs excellent opportunities to take the initiative in
the media relations mission. Even if there is no public
acknowledgement that specific units have been alerted,26 there
will be enough visible signatures to lead to speculation. During
the deployment to Southwest Asia, the presence of large numbers
of soldiers in civilian stores purchasing sunscreen and bottled
water clearly indicated an alert status.27 To retain
credibility, some explanation should be available when the
reporters call.
Most importantly, efforts in these initial stages can allow
commanders to achieve some early objectives at a time when
commanders can expect reporters to be functioning at full
tempo.28 As appropriate, deployment plans should allocate seats
for local and regional journalists to travel with the force into
the operational area. First, this step ensures that news media
are included with the force, an important initial goal; there is
no reason to wait until arrival to accomplish this task.
Additionally, those journalists who have covered the organization
regularly and perhaps have participated in various exercises are
more likely to be familiar with the military in general and with
the deploying units in particular; are immediately available for
inclusion because they live close to the deployment base; and are
particularly helpful to the total public affairs effort because
their stories are sent back to the towns and regions in which the
force lives and assist in informing those who remain behind,
including the families.
In our uncertain international security environment, the
military is facing a variety of unfamiliar challenges.
Preparations for news media relations will vary significantly
depending on the mission, OPSEC concerns, and the tone of the

message to be communicated. In addition to familiar combat
contingencies, commanders could also find themselves as
participants in complex crisis management efforts, humanitarian
aid and disaster relief missions, and
peacekeeping/peacemaking/peace-enforcement operations. Strict
limits on OPSEC which are familiar in combat contingencies give
way to transparency in humanitarian aid, disaster relief and
peacekeeping operations.
All military missions provide the types of activities and
information on which journalists inevitably focus. Regardless of
circumstances, the first rule of communicating with the news
media is to speak within the limits of one's own expertise and
responsibility. A very inefficient approach is to prepare a list
of subjects that anyone speaking with a reporter may discuss. In
fact, it is usually easier to focus on those issues respondents
should not talk about. In general, the relationship between the
reporter and the soldier is simple: That which is said is
reported. Thus it is important that military personnel understand
the concept of "security at the source" which establishes the
standard that information known to be classified or sensitive
should not be provided to a reporter.
Since every mission will have different OPSEC concerns,
operational planning should establish and update subjects which
should be candidly acknowledged as sensitive and, thus, not
subject to discussion. Within the context of "security at the
source," the following provides general guidance for response:
• Who: Which units? What equipment? Weapons systems?
• What: Performed what missions?
• Where: Self-explanatory.
• When: Could be sensitive. Discuss in advance? Announce as
it happens? Wait?
• Why: Emphasize the general mission statement. Provide
context.
• How: Discuss doctrine, operational art, and tactics (a
good opportunity to educate).
To the extent possible, this information should be
disseminated through the public affairs guidance (PAG) prepared
for each mission; equally essential is the need to update the
guidance regularly. Once again, an intelligent assessment of what
is truly sensitive opens up opportunities for the open discussion
of all other issues, emphasizing the full range and complexity of
the military effort.29 Commanders and their public affairs staffs
"possess" the story and can most efficiently communicate by
facilitating inclusion of the reporters and assisting in their
understanding of what they are experiencing and reporting.

The Way Ahead.
Traditionally, one of the functions of the news media has
been to provide the first draft of history through the reporting
of the events, issues and personalities of their times. While the
emerging trend is for journalists to become participants in those
events, definers of the issues and some of the most influential
personalities, their basic role remains unchanged. In response to
the pace and complexity of events and issues and the speed of the
reporting process, it will be increasingly important for the
military to become active, visible participants in the dialogue
leading to the production of news reports. It is no longer
sufficient to remain passive in the face of news media scrutiny,
reluctantly accept the visit of a reporter, and then complain
about the results. The facts are that the age of activist
journalism places special demands on the time and resources of
the commander and often results in confrontations with the
military.
There is a view that the tension between the military and
the news media will diminish with the evolution of younger
officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel who have matured, not just
watching television, but by having their growth and development
recorded on home video cameras. While it is perhaps inevitable
that the comfort level of the military with the news media will
thus improve, this trend will be matched by ever decreasing
levels of familiarity and understanding which young reporters
will have for their contemporaries in the military. Further,
budget constraints on news coverage have led to the practice of
"parachuting" in which reporters are "dropped" into a story with
little preparation and are left there only long enough shoot some
video, take a few pictures, and record a variety of observations
before being extracted and assigned to another story. Such
superficial reporting could have a significant impact on public
perceptions about the operation. Thus the need for regular
contact through educational opportunities, training visits and
exercises will remain at least as important as now.
This is especially true as the news media's impact on the
public agenda and public discussion continues to grow, but in new
ways unfamiliar today. While traditional television and radio
networks, newspapers and magazines may become less relevant,
emerging computer technology which will enable citizens to select
their own print and broadcast stories from an extensive menu of
news services will open fresh opportunities to reach the public,
but only if the message and the messenger communicate credibility
and retain the public's trust. Obviously it is not possible for
military leaders to speak personally with each member of the
public, domestic or international. Thus the bond of
interdependence strengthens between the military as the source of
the message and the news media as the messenger.

Traditional concerns about technology will also remain
central to the relationship between the military and the news
media as will its increasing impact on OPSEC and public
understanding. Additionally, because of new capabilities, the
public forum for the military will no longer be limited to those
local journalists who live around bases or even to the national
reporters who cover security issues at the Pentagon. News media
coverage has come to rely on a vast international system of
electronic images, text and data which ensures that stories about
events in the most remote areas can be made quickly available to
any interested news organization. The historic arrival of the
first NATO aircraft in Baku, Azerbaijan, on February 5, 1992, was
covered by a young radio reporter who was employed as a
"stringer" for an American radio network. She then produced two
sets of reports and interviews: one for her local audience and
one for transmission to the United States.30
Ultimately, however, technology only affects the speed of
the reporting process and not the quality of the stories
themselves. Both institutions will continue to share a common
interest in ensuring the accuracy and completeness of every
report before it is transmitted over a satellite telephone, video
uplink or data line. For the military commander, this will
involve the development of a comprehensive news media plan and
the commitment of knowledgeable personnel and dedicated resources
at the earliest stages of the dialogue with journalists, whoever
they are and whatever news organization they represent. Chasing a
story once it is produced is far less efficient because it
requires the correction of misperceptions and the repeated
restatement of the military position, distracting commanders from
the events and stories which continue to move forward. Typically,
a delayed response which focuses on a published news media report
sacrifices the initiative to the reporters, confuses the public
and contributes to the persistent tension with the news media,
thus making the next story more difficult to tell.
In thinking forward about the news media relations mission,
commanders should not fear the inevitable news report. What they
should be concerned about are those stories which contain factual
errors, misrepresent the goals of an operation, or create false
expectations for performance. Fortunately, commanders can affect
the quality of reporting by preparing a tailored package of
public affairs policies, plans and support packages appropriate
to each assigned operation. Normally, commanders will find that
most journalists are interested in improving the quality of their
own reporting even if it means adapting to reasonable ground
rules and procedures outlined by the military. Yet commanders,
operational staffs and public affairs practitioners can only
directly affect their own assessments, policy judgements,
planning and news media relations decisions. They cannot control
the news media's reactions or behavior and should not waste
effort, time and resources to do so.
Thinking forward takes the initiative by seeking confident

engagement with the news media rather than uncertain avoidance or
defensive conflict. This includes holding reporters to standards
of accuracy and completeness and developing strategies to
"correct the record" if events or comments are misrepresented.
The relationship between the military and the news media can
allow for both institutions to act as equal partners in the
communications process. From the military's perspective, the
effort should be directed toward assessing the levels of news
media interest to be expected in any assigned mission;
determining how many reporters can be accommodated in the
operational units and what procedures are necessary to assist in
their inclusion; and identifying what technology is required,
and, like all support packages, ensuring that it is available
early enough to affect positively the news media relations
environment. Central to the entire effort is the need to make
certain that the public affairs plan efficiently supports the
commander's scheme of maneuver to include the requirements of
OPSEC.
Ultimately, of course, the goal is that the next time the
lights come on, either literally or metaphorically, the situation
will be interpreted as an opportunity to tell the military story,
and that the soldiers, regardless of position, will be trained
well enough to respond candidly, explain effectively, and
continue the mission.
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